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A Beast’s Best Friend:
Interspecies Friendship
in the Thought of C. S. Lewis
by Edwin Woodruff Tait
Edwin Woodruff Tait is a parent, homesteader, and
independent scholar living in Richmond, Kentucky. He
received his Ph.D. in religion, specializing in sixteenthcentury church history, from Duke University in 2005, and is
the author of numerous articles in Christian History, where he
is a contributing editor.

On May 15, 1942, C. S. Lewis wrote to Sister Penelope, “I am
establishing quite a friendship with one of the rabbits wh. we now keep
along with the deer in Magdalen grove. It was done by the discovery
that he relishes chestnut leaves which grow too high for his teeth. He
doesn’t yet allow me any familiarities but he comes and eats from my
hand. If my jaws were as strong in proportion to my size as his I’d be
able to pluck down the pinnacles of the tower with my teeth. But oh!
The great lollipop eyes and the twitching velvet nose! How does He
come to create both this and the scorpion?”1
On July 29, he reported that “the Rabbit and I have quarrelled.
. . . [H]e has cut me dead several times lately. . . . [S]o fair and yet so
fickle!”2 On December 10 he wrote to Arthur Greeves describing his
relationship with the rabbit as “an acquaintance (almost a friendship)”
and still lamenting that the rabbit wouldn’t look at him.3 But Lewis
eventually found a new rabbit friend. On July 26, 1944, he wrote to
Sarah Neylan that he was “getting to be quite friends with an old
Rabbit who lives in the Wood at Magdalen,” whom he had tamed by
picking leaves off the trees and feeding them to the rabbit (the same
method he had used with the first rabbit), and whom he named “Baron
Biscuit.”4 In December of 1944 he wrote to Laurence Harwood of the
same rabbit, whom he had apparently discovered was actually female
and was now calling “Baroness Bisket.”5
Of course these letters are whimsical, and perhaps I am taking
them too seriously. But Lewis took friendship very seriously indeed.
1
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4
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C. S. Lewis, Collected Letters 2:520-21.
Collected Letters 2:525.
Collected Letters 2:540.
Collected Letters 2:618-19.
Collected Letters 2:634.
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Ironically, given his willingness to speak of being friends with a rabbit,
he complained to Bede Griffiths that he was worried about the “decay
of friendship” due to “the endless presence of women everywhere” as
a threat to friendship. Friendship—specifically male friendship—was
central to Lewis’s life. Furthermore, the theme of human-animal or
cross-species friendship in particular shows up throughout Lewis’s
work, as this paper will show. Lewis appears to have been haunted
throughout his life by the possibility of a friendship that unites beings
who are fundamentally different.
Lewis’s reference to his acquaintance with the rabbit as “almost a
friendship” in the letter to Arthur Greeves may reflect his awareness of
the fact that friendship between humans and “irrational” animals was
declared impossible by the Aristotelian tradition. Thomas Aquinas
treats the question in Question 25 of Summa Theologiae II/II, on “the
object of charity.”6 According to Aquinas, charity is fundamentally
the act of loving one’s neighbor “so that he may be in God” (article
1). Charity “has the nature of friendship” (article 2), which consists
in willing good to another. The specific good that charity wills for
another is union with God. Thus, when Aquinas comes to deal with
the question of whether irrational creatures may be loved out of
charity in article 3, only one of his three reasons for answering in
the negative pertain to the specific nature of charity (willing eternal
happiness to another, which Aquinas argues is impossible in the case
of irrational creatures who are not capable of such happiness). The
other two apply to friendship more broadly, and are based on separate
passages in Aristotle.
Aquinas’ first reason why friendship between humans and
“irrational” creatures is impossible is that friendship consists in willing
good to another. However, an irrational creature cannot, strictly
speaking, “possess good,” because it lacks free will. Only a being with
intellect and will is capable of choosing a good for itself and thus being
benefited or harmed. Aquinas cites Aristotle’s discussion of chance
in Book 2 of the Physics. Aristotle argues there (chapter 6) that “an
inanimate thing or a lower animal or a child cannot do anything by
6
Lewis suggested in a 1958 letter that most elements in his thought that
people took to be Thomistic were really Aristotelian, describing Aquinas as a
“top form” boy in the same class as Lewis, where Lewis was a “bottom form
boy” and Aristotle was the teacher. (Collected Letters 3:995). That being said,
Aquinas is important for placing Aristotelian ideas in a Christian context,
and is often identified by writers on animal rights as a major (negative)
influence on Christian attitudes to animals.
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chance, because it is incapable of deliberate intention; nor can ‘good
fortune’ or ‘ill fortune’ be ascribed to them, except metaphorically.”
Both in his commentary on this text and in the Summa, Aquinas
explains that this is the case because a being without free will does not
have “dominion over its own action” (dominium sui actus).7
As Judith Barad points out, this view seems inconsistent with
Aquinas’ recognition elsewhere that animals have inclinations and
appetites and are not simply to be equated with plants or inanimate
objects.8 Given that recognition, is it not more reasonable to conclude,
on Aquinas’ own principles, that animals can experience “good and
ill fortune” to some degree, albeit to a lesser degree than humans?
This is one of a number of places where it seems to me that Aquinas’
reverence for Aristotle has a baleful effect on his thought.
Aquinas’ second reason for denying the possibility of human/
animal friendship is based in a different passage from Aristotle, this
one from Book 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle defines
friendship as “living together,” or, in Aquinas’ terms, a “sharing of life”
(communicatio vitae).9 Humans and animals, according to Aquinas,
cannot share life together in the way required for friendship. They
do not have common goals (in part, again, because animals are not
capable of deliberate intentionality according to Aquinas). Without
sharing a rational nature, friendship is impossible.
Lewis’s account of his friendship with the rabbit follows exactly
the lines sketched out by Barad, ascribing to the rabbit exactly the
sort of intentionality that Aquinas would allow (a desire for food),
but then extrapolating from that to allow for the use of language that
Aquinas would no doubt find unacceptably anthropomorphic. The
7 Comm. in Phys. 229, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics2.htm#6,
accessed 12 May 2016. Similarly, in ST II/II 25.3, Aquinas says that good
and bad pertains to “solum creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono
quod habet per liberum arbitrium” (http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/
sth3025.html, accessed 12 May 2016).
8 Judith Barad, “Aquinas’ Inconsistency on the Nature and the Treatment
of Animals.” Barad is unfair to Aquinas, I think, in her treatment of his
claim that we should not treat animals cruelly because it will make us cruel
to people. While it’s true that Aquinas doesn’t recognize that animals
have any intrinsic rights or that we have moral duties to them directly, his
“virtue ethics” leads him to conclude that treating animals cruelly develops
a “habitus” of cruelty. This is, I think, more significant ethically than Barad
recognizes.
9 Nicomachaen Ethics, Book 8, chapter 5, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
nicomachaen.8.viii.html (accessed 12 May 2016).
z

44  z

Proceedings from the Francis White Ewbank Colloquium
rabbit initially becomes friends with Lewis because he desires to eat
leaves that are too high for him to reach. Lewis speculates that the
rabbit later rejects his friendship because Lewis had inadvertently
given him something to eat that “disagreed with him.”10 A desire for
food is, after all, something humans share with other animals, even in
the Aristotelian paradigm. A human may therefore seek to satisfy that
desire by giving an animal good food, and thus establish precisely that
“sharing of life” which Aquinas disallows. Of course I am probably
making far too much of this episode, but the frequency with which
Lewis refers to the rabbit(s) during the mid-1940s indicates, I think,
that it was of some importance to him.
Another incident, this one narrated by George Sayer, confirms
Lewis’s interest in the capacity of non-human animals for friendship
and affection. Sayer describes walking with Lewis late in the latter’s
life and seeing a young pig give food to an older pig. According to
Sayer, Lewis responded excitedly to this incident, declaring the young
pig to be a “pog” and the harbinger of a new stage in porcine evolution,
and asking for its blessing.11 Like the rabbit friendships, this incident
is obviously playful and humorous, but it is further evidence of Lewis’s
interest in the possibility of animal behavior that transcended the
limits set by Aristotle.
The most systematic discussion of the capacity of non-human
animals for friendship in Lewis’s work occurs in That Hideous Strength.
Ivy Maggs, who functions in the novel as a voice of folk wisdom in
contrast to the educated folly of characters such as Jane and MacPhee,
refers to Mr. Bultitude the bear and Pinch the cat as “friends.”
MacPhee insists that they can’t really be friends, and suggests various
physiological explanations for their behavior, including the possibility
of unconscious sexual attraction. Ivy responds defensively as if MacPhee
were accusing the animals of moral indecency.12 Ransom intervenes to
say that MacPhee is ascribing to the animals a distinction that simply
does not exist for them. What we call “friendship” among humans is
for us more articulately distinguished from physical comfort, sexual
attraction, etc., than it is for other animals, but that doesn’t mean that
something analogous to friendship does not exist among animals.13
Lewis further illustrates this theory of animal psychology by narrating
a later section of the book from the point of view of Mr. Bultitude,
10
11
12
13

Collected Letters 2:540.
George Sayer, Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis, 335.
C. S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, 261.
C. S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, 261-62.
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or more precisely from the point of view of the omniscient narrator
trying to explain how Mr. Bultitude experienced the events.14
The events in question include important parts of the novel’s
climax, in which Merlin, assisted by Mr. Bultitude and inhabited by
the eldila, brings heavenly vengeance to the demonic N.I.C.E. And
it is no coincidence that one of the N.I.C.E.’s principal activities is
experimenting on animals. Mark Studdock betrays the inadequacy of
his modern, sociological education as a form of moral formation by the
fact that he has no moral revulsion to the awareness that the N.I.C.E.
maintains a vast zoo of animals for purposes of experimentation,
and no empathy with the animals.15 They simply represent, for him,
evidence of the scale of the N.I.C.E.’s enterprise. This is an example of
the way in which one’s reaction to vivisection functions, for Lewis, as
a moral test. Not to be disturbed by animal suffering—to have a purely
“instrumental” view of animals—is evidence of a lack of participation
in what Lewis elsewhere calls the “Tao.”16
The proper understanding of our relationship with non-human
animals is found at the end of That Hideous Strength in the epithalamium
of the beasts, in which all the animals (including the human ones) pair
up under the benign influence of Perelandra: “she comes more near
the earth than she was wont—to make Earth sane.”17 This sanity not
only leads to amorous coupling, but to a restoration of the natural state
of humanity: “We are now as we ought to be, between the angels who
are our elder brothers and the beasts who are our jesters, servants, and
playfellows.”18
This understanding of the human relationship with animals
is found at more length in Perelandra, where the unfallen “Lady”
commands the creatures of Venus and they obey her willingly. They
are, as in Ransom’s statement quoted above, her “servants.” There
is clearly a hierarchical relationship. But it is also characterized by
joyful companionship. Both Ransom and the “Un-man” benefit from
the willingness of Perelandra’s animals to serve human beings. The
Un-man, of course, abuses that willingness, commandeering a fish in
order to escape Ransom with no thought for the fish’s welfare.19
14
15
16
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That Hideous Strength, 306-08, 350.
That Hideous Strength, 102.
C. S. Lewis, Abolition of Man, 70,
That Hideous Strength, 378.
That Hideous Strength, 378.
C. S. Lewis, Perelandra, 158.
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He (it?) also casually tortures frogs, and Ransom’s final
confrontation with the Un-man begins when Ransom attempts
to stop the torture of a bird.20 One of the most disturbing signs of
the Lady’s slow “corruption” by the Un-man’s temptations is her
willingness to let him dress her in a cloak of feathers to make her more
beautiful, and her casual disinterest in the question of just how the
Un-man got the feathers.21 Animals are servants and in some sense
instruments in Perelandra, but they are not mere instruments, and the
slightest movement toward treating them as such is a matter of grave
significance.
One of the Un-man’s most telling arguments against Ransom
in their extensive debate over the fate of the Lady and her planet is
that Ransom’s discomfort with the prospect of humans replacing
non-human sentient beings as the focus of “Maleldil’s” purposes in
the universe mark Ransom out as “what we call ‘Bad,’” which the
Un-man defines as someone who turns away from the coming good
out of preference for past good.22 The “Unman ethic,” which led the
human Weston to surrender himself to demonic forces and become
the “Unman” and is identified by Lewis with Bergson’s “creative
evolution,” is a worship of “becoming” for its own sake.23
Weston tells Ransom that this ethic transcends conventional
notions of good and evil because what is conventionally called evil is
actually the driving force pushing into the future, while “good” is the
ideal that beckons from the future. Weston admits to Ransom that
his earlier views, evident in Out of the Silent Planet, were irrationally
anthropocentrism. All that matters is “Life,” whatever form Life
may take. 24 Reading this text for the first time, I took this to be a
sign of conversion and spiritual growth in Weston. Weston’s violent,
colonialist anthropocentrism is condemned throughout Out of the
Silent Planet. Surely his willingness to recognize “Life” in non-human
forms is an improvement?
But of course it is this “conversion” to Life-force worship that
leads to “Weston’s” horrific transformation from a misguided,
perhaps evil human being to a demon wearing a human body, with
the fragmented psyche of the original “Weston” still gibbering away
somewhere in the depths and occasionally surfacing when the “Un20
21
22
23
24

Perelandra, 152.
Perelandra, 134-138.
Perelandra, 114.
Perelandra, 90-96, 121.
Perelandra, 91.
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man” allows it to for pragmatic purposes.25 The primary characteristic
of the demonic form of “creative evolution” represented by the Un-man
is its total pragmatism, its instrumentalizing of absolutely everything,
even (as Ransom observes at one point) rationality itself. In Out of
the Silent Planet, Oyarsa had identified Weston’s loyalty to his own
species as a genuine virtue, although a minor one.26 Weston’s loss of
this virtue represents not a step forward on the moral and spiritual
scale but his final loss of the “good of intellect” and his descent into
demonic madness.
Thus, the Un-man’s argument to the Lady about Ransom’s
“badness” is complex and ironic. He is evoking the orthodox
anthropocentrism which the Lady assumes, in order to seduce her to
his own worship of pointless destruction in the name of change and
evolution. Ransom’s sorrow that there will be no more sentient “beasts”
but only anthromoporphic beings now that the Incarnation has taken
place is, in the context of the Space Trilogy, a response to his experiences
in the first book and his choice to identify with the nonhuman
Malacandrians over Weston’s murderous anthropocentrism.
The unfallen Lady cannot understand this impulse. She knows
only a healthy hierarchical relationship with animals who are not hnau
(rational), the kind of relationship sketched by Ransom at the end of
the third book.27 (Indeed, Ransom’s own journey to spiritual maturity
in the course of Perelandra consists in part of his coming to see the
beauty and fittingness of this kind of anthropocentrism.) The Lady is
thus ironically in danger of accepting Weston’s demonic ideology in
contrast to Ransom’s flawed but basically virtuous sympathy for the
“older” forms of rational creation represented by the Malacandrians.
Yet Ransom’s point of view is not all wrong, as indicated by the “Great
Dance” at the end of Perelandra, which affirms that everything in the
universe is in its own way a “center” and that the Malacandrians are
not just disposable precursors to the real show.28
Moving backwards within the Trilogy, we come finally to Out
of the Silent Planet, where we find (for the first time in Lewis’s work if
we don’t count the Boxen material) a fictional depiction of a society
of non-human rational beings (hnau). As Ransom journeys through
the Malacandrian landscape, he journeys spiritually from an initial
abject fear of non-human life (filtered through the deeply depraved
25
26
27
28

Perelandra, 96.
Out of the Silent Planet, 137-138.
That Hideous Strength, 378.
Perelandra, 214-219.
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imaginations of Weston and Devine), to a gradual understanding and
acceptance of the great diversity under which rationality manifests
itself.
Ransom’s friendship with the hross Hyoi is the catalyst for his
coming to a sober understanding of his species’ place in the universe—
which will, ironically, make him reluctant to accept the revelation of
just how important humans are in the cosmic scheme in Perelandra).
When he first meets Hyoi, he interprets him as an “animal,” just as
he sees the seroni as monsters.29 Ironically, Hyoi’s animality helps
Ransom deal with the shock of dealing with a sentient alien lifeform.
When he thinks of Hyoi as a man, he finds him monstrous, but when
he thinks of him as an animal, he finds him a kind of “animal 2.0,”
with everything one might wish in a pet plus the ability to function as
an intellectual equal.30
Weston and Devine’s killing of Hyoi induces in Ransom a deep
guilt for being human, an awareness of just how murderous and fallen
his species is. The narrative has prepared us for the possibility that
Hyoi will be killed by the monstrous hnakra, but in fact he successfully
kills the hnakra only to be killed by the humans, driving home Lewis’s
point about just who the real monsters are in the story.31
The multispecies rationality of Malacandra is not essential
to its “unfallenness,” but Lewis clearly suggests, through Ransom’s
complete lack of comprehension of the possibility of the three species
living in harmony, that it is only possible on an unfallen world and
is thus one of the signs of the planet’s innocence. One of the sorns
remarks at one point that the people of “Thulcandra” (our planet) must
be “at the mercy of their blood” because we cannot compare thought
with thought that “floats on a different blood.” Toward the end of
the book Ransom stays in a guesthouse with all three Malacandrian
species, and realizes that Malacandrian humor arises largely from the
interactions of hnau who have different biologies.32 In a purported
letter from Ransom to Lewis appended to the book, he claims that
while we can have friendship with other humans and affectionate
relationships with animal pets, on Malacandra the two experiences
may be combined in a single relationship. Hence, the Malacandrians
do not need pets.33
29
30
31
32
33

Out of the Silent Planet, 55, 45.
Out of the Silent Planet, 58.
Out of the Silent Planet, 125.
Out of the Silent Planet, 117.
Out of the Silent Planet, 156.
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Four years after writing this, Lewis was telling various
correspondents about his friendship with the rabbit in the Magdalen
garden. It is probably not a coincidence that the years during which
he writes about these “rabbit friendships” are also years when he was
working on the Space Trilogy, developing his first major fictional
universe that explored the possibility of multiple rational species and
the disastrous consequences of a purely instrumental approach to life.
Lewis’s fullest exploration of a world filled with multiple
intelligent species was, of course, his Chronicles of Narnia. When Lucy
Pevensie steps out of the wardrobe into that snowy wood, she steps into
a world where our normal assumptions about the place of humanity
appear to be upended. Mr. Tumnus is astonished to meet a human,
and his library contains books suggesting that humans are mythical
creatures.34 The White Witch attempts at first to put Edmund in
Narnian categories, suggesting that he must be an overgrown dwarf
who has cut off his beard.35 The Beavers tell the Pevensies that “there’s
never been any of your race here before.”36 While the White Witch
looks human, the Beavers assure the children that she isn’t really
human at all.37
Yet it turns out that humans are not as alien to Narnia as first
appears. There are those four thrones in Cair Paravel destined to be
filled by “sons of Adam and daughters of Eve.”38 While humans in
this first Narnia book appear to be a novel introduction into Narnia,
they are not unheard-of and a place has been prepared for them
by prophecy, as rulers of the land under Aslan. At the same time,
a “pseudo-human” ruler oppresses the various creatures of Narnia,
favoring some (wolves, dwarfs, and various kinds of monsters) over
others and mimicking with her tyranny of dark magic the properly
hierarchical rule Aslan intends for Narnia. The White Witch’s regime
is in fact a reversal of the attitudes of the N.I.C.E., although it is
similar in its use of dark magic and its ultimate reduction of rights and
dignity to one all-powerful figure.
In the sequel, Prince Caspian, Lewis returns to themes familiar
from the Space Trilogy. A tyranny of humans has now slaughtered the
sentient non-humans or driven them into exile, and has put in place a
34 C. S. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 115 (all Narnia
citations are to the omnibus edition from HarperCollins).
35 The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 124.
36 The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 147.
37 The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 147.
38 The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, 148.
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stodgy, boring, materialistic society that denies magic and mystery and
suppresses freedom. At the same time, in this book the importance of
human rule is emphasized far more than in The Lion, the Witch, and the
Wardrobe. Trufflehunter insists that things were never right in Narnia
except when a Son of Adam was king. It isn’t a country for men, but
it’s a country for a man to be king of.39
Finally, in the penultimate book to be published, Magician’s
Nephew, Lewis provides his most systematic account of the Narnian
universe. Aslan creates all kinds of creatures and then chooses to
breathe sentient life into certain of them, giving the talking animals
authority over the non-sentient creatures while exhorting them to treat
them gently.40 He also (proving the Beavers wrong) makes a human
couple rulers of Narnia, exhorting them to treat all their subjects with
fairness and equality.41 Uncle Andrew’s stubborn insistence on closing
himself off from the voice of Aslan makes him unable to hear and
understand the voices of his non-human fellow creatures, and makes
him similarly opaque to them. But while he regards them as mere
“brutes” to be feared or used or destroyed, they show their virtuous
character by attempting to treat him kindly according to his nature,
even if their efforts are not very successful. By the end of the book
they have come to see him as a pet—an exception to the rule that in
Narnia, as in Malacandra, there don’t seem to be pets.42
Thus, in Narnia Lewis depicts a hierarchical society but one
where freedom and equality of dignity are highly valued. Friendship
among different kinds of creatures is not only possible but highly
valued. It is Lucy’s friendship with Tumnus that gives him the courage
to defy the Witch, and the children a motive for staying in Narnia in
spite of the dangers. In Prince Caspian, Dr. Cornelius, stranded in
a world of hostile humans, tells Caspian “what friend have I in the
wide world save Your Majesty?”43 In the same book, Trumpkin earns
the nickname “the dear little friend” from the children. Reepicheep’s
friendship with Lucy, in particular, is an important theme in Voyage
of the Dawn Treader. In The Silver Chair, the three Narnians respond
to the realization that they’ve been eating Talking Stag in varied ways
that correspond to their immersion in Narnian multispecies society:
Jill merely feels sorry for the stag, Eustace is horrified because he has
39
40
41
42
43

C. S. Lewis, Prince Caspian, 347.
C. S. Lewis, The Magician’s Nephew, 69-71.
The Magician’s Nephew, 81.
The Magician’s Nephew, 71-79, 97-98.
Prince Caspian, 343.
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actually had a talking animal as a friend, while Puddleglum feels as if
he had eaten a baby.44
But the Narnian book where interspecies friendship plays the
most important role is arguably The Horse and His Boy. Lewis may
be influenced by medieval romances such as Bevis of Hampton in
which horses speak to their riders and indeed play an important role in
training their riders in chivalry.45 Bree becomes a tutor to Shasta not
only in riding but in courtesy and “free” behavior. At the same time,
it turns out that Bree himself has a lot to learn. Friendship between
Shasta and Aravis, divided by social class, turns out to be even more
difficult than friendship between Shasta and Bree. In the end, the four
fugitives, two human and two equine, are brought together by their
shared journey from slavery to freedom, in which the strengths of both
species, both sexes, and a diversity of social experiences all contribute
to make their quest for freedom successful. The key moment in Aravis’
development from an arrogant (though honorable) Calormene lady to
the future Queen of Archenland is her decision to go across the desert
with a lower-class boy and two horses rather than stay in Calormen
with Lasaraleen.46
In the Chronicles, Lewis explores playfully the theme first
suggested in Out of the Silent Planet, that a world with multiple
intelligent species would have a capacity for rich and varied friendships
that surpasses our own and combines the emotional satisfaction we get
from friendship and the kind we get from pets. He explores Perelandra’s
suggestion that there might be different ways of configuring the
“center,” asking how God might be manifest in a world of talking
animals. And yet Narnia is in a sense more robustly anthropocentric
than the world of the Trilogy. There humans are central because
Maleldil has become human. Narnia is supposedly an entirely other
world, with a parallel “incarnation” of the Logos as a lion.
Yet it is also a world where “Sons of Adam” are supposed to reign.
Lewis never explains why. Does the significance of the Incarnation
radiate outward even to worlds reachable only by magic? Is Narnia,
after all, a kind of shadow world to our own? Or did he just not think it
through? Nonetheless, the Narnia books underline Lewis’s fascination
with the possibility of friendship with the “other” and his hatred of all
forms of tyranny of one kind of creature over another, and all forms
44 C. S. Lewis, The Silver Chair, 608.
45 See Bonnie J. Erwin, “Beyond Mastery: Interspecies Apprenticeship in
Middle English Romance.”
46 C. S. Lewis, The Horse and His Boy, 253.
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of cruelty to animals—or to anyone. The hierarchy of Narnia, like the
hierarchy of the Trilogy, is fundamentally non-coercive. All beings act
according to their natures, and thus a spontaneous order emerges in
which difference does not involve dominance or competition.
One interspecies friendship in Narnia, however, towers above
the rest—that between Aslan and the human children.47 Of course,
Aslan is a special case, because at the end of The Last Battle “he no
longer looked to them like a lion,” and he is clearly intended to be a
“parallel incarnation” of Christ in some sense.48 (Whether this implies
a kind of Docetistic Christology, as one Catholic critic has claimed, is
a separate issue).49
But by making the children experience the divine as an animal,
Lewis provides us with his most daring example of interspecies
friendship. Aslan really is “the wholly other,” and yet he embodies an
archetype that has powerful resonance in our world as well. Lewis had
always been fond of human-animal relationships as a symbol of our
relationship with God, particularly using dogs in this way. In Narnia,
he reverses the imagery—the humans have a relationship with an
animal who is also a manifestation of the divine. The characters who
see Aslan as merely a “wild beast” are characters who at best (like
Trumpkin) need some serious spiritual growth, or at worst (like Uncle
Andrew) are stubbornly closed off from the divine, and indeed from
recognizing the dignity of their fellow creatures no matter the species.
Lewis’s imaginative explorations of human interactions with
non-human species, as well as his frequent discussions of the subject in
letters and nonfictional works, suggest that he was both working within
and implicitly challenging the Aristotelian/Thomist framework. He
clearly accepted the premise that friendship involves the ability to
share goals and a way of life, and he imagined ways in which humans
and other animals might do so. He accepted the premise that willing
the good of another implies that the other has agency, and again, he
repeatedly ascribes agency to “irrational” animals. Furthermore, he
developed fictional universes in which non-human “rational” beings
existed.
These universes are still (in a qualified sense) anthropocentric,
and (in a less qualified sense) hierarchical. But it is also an imaginative
celebration of diversity and multiculturalism that (one would think)
47 I am indebted to Padmini Sukumaran for pointing this out in
conversation.
48 C. S. Lewis, The Last Battle, 767.
49 Eric Seddon, “Letters to Malcom and the Trouble With Narnia.”
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ought to shatter the preconceptions of people who see Lewis as simply
a defender of traditional British mores and the privileges of straight
white males. In the words of Perelandra: “Thus each is equally at the
center and none are there by being equals, but some by giving place and
some by receiving it, the small things by their smallness and the great
by their greatness, and all the patterns linked and looped together by
the unions of a kneeling with a sceptred love. . . . We also have need
beyond measure of all that He has made. Love me, my brothers, for
I am infinitely necessary to you and for your delight I was made. . . .
Love me, my brothers, for I am infinitely superfluous, and your love
shall be like His, born neither of your need nor of my deserving, but a
plain bounty. Blessed be He!”50

50

Perelandra, 217.
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